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CALVIN, PLANTING A, AND THE NATURAL
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD: A RESPONSE
TO BEVERSLUIS
Michael Czapkay Sudduth

In this paper I present a critical response to several claims made by John
Beversluis on the closely allied topics of natural knowledge of God and the
noetic effects of sin in relation to the work of John Calvin and Alvin Plantinga.
I challenge Beversluis' claim that Plantinga has misconstrued Calvin's position
on the sensus divinitatis and that he has weakened Calvin's doctrine of the noetic effects of sin. Moreover, I develop a coherent case for the sense in which
Calvin maintains that fallen humans do and do not have a natural knowledge of
God. My conclusion rebuts Beversluis' claim that Calvin denies any natural
knowledge of God for fallen human persons and defends Plantinga's philosophical account of Calvin's sensus divinitatis.

In the 1930s Karl Barth and Emil Brunner debated whether and to what
extent human persons have a natural knowledge of God, especially as
this question arises in the context of John Calvin's discussion of the
knowledge of God in his Institutes of the Christian Religion. Barth is well
known for his rejection of natural theology on the grounds that there is
no knowledge of God, even as creator, apart from a knowledge of God
as redeemer. Barth's slogan, finitum non capax infiniti est, expressed his
fundamental conviction that God can only be known when He reveals
Himself and the noetic effects of sin entail that grace is a necessary precondition for all knowledge of God.
In his challenging article "Reforming the 'Reformed' Objection to
Natural Theology," (Faith and Philosophy 12, April 1995)' John Beversluis
has resurrected the closely related topics of the natural knowledge of
God and the noetic effects of sin in the context of contemporary philosophy of religion. His focus is the religious epistemology of Alvin
Plantinga. Beversluis contends that Plantinga has misconstrued Calvin's
doctrine of the sensus divinitatis (sense of divinity) and as a result has
substantially weakened Calvin's account of the noetic effects of sin.
Beversluis maintains that Calvin, unlike Plantinga, is a fideist. Calvin, he
claims, explicitly denies any natural knowledge of God for fallen human
persons. It is my contention that it is Beversluis who has misconstrued
Calvin's position on the natural knowledge of God, and as a result his
critique of Plantinga is significantly defective.
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1. Plantinga, the Sensus Divinitatis, and the Noetic Effects of Sin

Beversluis' first argument aims at showing that Plantinga has misunderstood Calvin's treatment of the sensus divinitatis in the opening chapters of the
Institutes. Consequently, Plantinga's account of what fallen human persons are
able to know by the deliverances of reason radically minimizes the noetic
effects of sin and is incompatible with Calvin's account of natural knowledge
of God. Beversluis begins by pointing out Plantinga's well- known interpretation of the opening chapters of Book I of the Institutes of the Christian Religion:
Calvin believes that there is within the human mind an innate disposition to
form belief in God in a broad range of widely realized experiential circumstances. Plantinga identifies this theistic belief-forming mechanism with what
Calvin calls the sensus divinitatis, and it is triggered by the kinds of circumstances discussed by Calvin in chapter 5 of Book 1 of the Institutes (e.g., sight
of the starry night sky).2 In these circumstances people do often form beliefs
like God has created all this, God is present, etc. Plantinga maintains that this tendency to fonn beliefs in God has been adversely affected by sin so that people
do not always form theistic beliefs with the natural spontaneity they were
designed to (and possibly fail to form belief in God at all in some instances).)
Nonetheless, there still exists an actual natural knowledge of God for many
fallen human persons.
Beversluis claims that Plantinga has taken Calvin's discussion of the sensus
divinitatis out of context. Whereas Plantinga understands Calvin's references
to a functioning sensus divinitatis (in the Institutes 1:1-5) to refer to humans in
their fallen state, Beversluis maintains that Calvin's discussion of the natural
knowledge of God in these chapters is confined to a consideration of man's
pre-fallen (or pre-Iapsarian) state and so, being inapplicable to the epistemic
capacities of fallen (or post-Iapsarian) humans, is irrelevant to giving an
account of the human epistemic situation with reference to belief in God.
According to Beversluis, the fundamental thesis of the opening chapters of
Book I of the Institutes is that "fallen human beings lack both the direct and
immediate knowledge of God with which they were created and the capacity
to achieve it" (RRO, p. 193). The sensus divinitatis is not merely "suppressed"
by sin, but it is extinguished by sin (RRO, pp. 193-94). As a result, the sensus
divinitatis "with which human beings were originally created is no longer
operative in fallen humanity" (RRO, p. 193). Although there remains an objectively clear revelation of God (as Creator) in nature, it is subjectively obscured
by sin. In fact, the revelation of God as Creator is not seen at all. Beversluis
contrasts Plantinga's interpretation of Calvin with his own: Calvin "unambiguously asserts that, in their present fallen condition, human beings have no
eyes to discern the revelation of God in Nature" (lillO, p. 194).
After quoting Calvin (Institutes 1.5.15) to the effect that post-Iapsarian
humans are by nature unable to attain "the pure and clear knowledge of
God" he continues ....
Not only does Calvin not say what Plantinga claims he says; he
explicitly denies it. According to Calvin, it is emphatically not the
case that there is in fallen human beings "a disposition to believe
propositions of the sort this flower was created by God or this vast
intricate universe was created by God when we contemplate the
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flower or behold the starry heavens or think about the vast reaches
of the universe" (R&BG, 80) ....
Hence in spite of the universally present but epistemically inefficacious revelation of God in nature and in spite of the ineradicable but
epistemically blinded sensus divinitatis in human nature, the pre-fallen "innate tendency, or nisus, or disposition" to believe in God with
[which] human beings were originally created is now "suppressed"
and "smothered" by ignorance and wickedness. (RRO, p. 195)
Beversluis then gives what he takes to be Calvin's account of how fallen
human beings can and do attain knowledge of God. What is needed is the
revelation of God in the Scriptures, as well as an internal work of grace in
the heart. The natural revelation of God in creation cannot be perceived
without faith. Without the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit fallen
humans "are not capable - much less, innately disposed - to form the belief
that God exists upon contemplating the beauty or the grandeur of Nature"
(RRO, p. 196). In their fallen state humans "can believe in God only so far
as the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit enables them to do so." (RRO,
p. 197). The point is reiterated in his striking conclusion: "He [Calvin] is a
fideist through and through - a theologian who believes that, so far as fallen human beings are concerned, knowledge of God is the result of the
internal illumination of the Holy Spirit and hence a gift to God's elect"
(RRO, p. 200).4
It seems then that Beversluis is setting up the following distinction
between Plantinga and Calvin.
Plantinga maintains:
[PI] Human persons were originally created with a sensus divinitatis
which is triggered in a broad range of widely realized experiential conditions which result in the formation of theistic beliefs
BtV ... ,Btn (where these theistic beliefs are of the form God created
all this, God is present, etc.).
[P2] For human persons in their post-lapsarian state, the sensus

divinitatis, though functional, is subject to a range of malfunctions so that it does not always yield theistic beliefs in accordance with the original human cognitive design plan. s
Although Beversluis agrees that Calvin holds [PI], he thinks that instead
of [P2] Calvin maintains:
[C2] For human persons in their post-lapsarian state, the sensus
divinitatis is completely nonfunctional so that it does not result
in the formation of theistic beliefs BtV ... ,Btn.

and
[C3] For human persons in their post-lapsarian state, theistic beliefs

Bt1,. .. ,Btn are fomled only by divine agency through regeneration.

CALVIN, PLANTINGA, NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

95

It follows from [C2] and [C3] that:

[C4] For post-Iapsarian human persons, there is no natural knowl-

edge of God.

II. Two Kinds of Natural Knowledge of God
Do fallen human persons have a natural knowledge of God? The crux of
the argument here is the meaning of the locution "knowledge of God."
In the first part of Beversluis' paper, in which he presents his first critique of Plantinga, he assumes - like Plantinga - a true belief plus "something else" account of knowledge. Here it is propositional knowledge
about God that is at issue, and Beversluis' main claim is that the sensus
divinitatis is epistemically inefficacious since it does not produce theistic
beliefs of the sort that Plantinga claims. Plantinga's error is a defective view
of the noetic effects of sin, thinking that humans could naturally form theistic beliefs that they cannot apart from grace. Unless a person is given the
gift of faith by grace, there is no knowledge of God (i.e., true belief plus
something else) based on the revelation of God in nature.
However, in the second part of his paper, Beversluis introduces a different sense to the locution "knowledge of God." He says that the kind of
"knowledge" which Calvin thinks is essential to the Christian life is not
merely theoretical in nature (a knowledge that or about, so-called propositional knowledge) but a knowledge which is experiential or affective and
impacts human life and action. 6
After quoting from Calvin's Institutes (1.2.1 and 1.5.9), Beversluis writes:
Calvin is not interested in the bare assertion that "God exists" or
"there is such a person as God." His concern is not with certain
alleged "deliverances of reason" in the form of "properly basic"
beliefs. For him, knowledge of God is not theoretical knowledge
about God but a personal relationship to God which manifests itself in
a life of obedience and which leads to piety and morally upright conduct which he regards as the fruit of true religion. Knowing God
involves loving God. (RRO, pp. 198-199)
According to Beversluis grace is a necessary precondition for this particular kind of "knowledge of God", call it the "experiential" knowledge of
God, which includes a love of and obedience to God. This kind of knowledge is not the same as the theoretical or propositional knowledge
Beversluis discusses in the first part of his paper, and so the sense in which
fallen humans cannot have a natural knowledge of God changes in the
course of the paper. Although there is no logical inconsistency in denying
a post-Iapsarian natural knowledge of God in Beversluis' two senses, I do
not think that Beversluis has properly handled the distinction he draws.
Moreover, 1 think that the failure to handle this distinction properly leads
Beversluis into a rather significant contradiction in his paper.
After explaining the distinction between a mere theoretical knowledge
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of God and the affecting knowledge of God, Beversluis admits that fallen
humans "already believe in God" (RRO, p. 199). He adds: "there are no
atheists." Here Beversluis reconstructs what he takes to be Calvin's
"Reformed" objection to natural theology: since everyone already believes
in God, there is no point to constructing theistic arguments. And natural
theology is concerned with theoretical not experiential knowledge of God.
Beversluis takes these two points to be the essence of the original Reformed
objection to natural theology, not a commitment to properly basic theistic
beliefs as Plantinga holds.
I find Beversluis' statements in the second part of his paper most perplexing given all he argued in the first part of his article. The great dichotomy in his first argument was between a theoretical knowledge about God
construed as a deliverance of reason (Plantinga's Calvin) and the view that
all such theoretical knowledge is achievable only by divine grace
(Beversluis' Calvin).7 Much was made of the point that without grace fallen persons do not even have the capacity "to form the belief that God
exists" when they look at the beauty and grandeur of nature. What could
Beversluis possibly mean, then, when he asserts both (i) everyone already
believes in God and (ii) no one can believe in God apart from a work of
grace? If we assume (as Beversluis appears to) that grace is not given to
everyone, then (ii) entails that some people do not believe in God. But this
contradicts his later statements according to which people do hold certain
propositions about the existence of God. Perhaps part of the problem here
is that Beversluis does not unpack his crucial concession that people do
believe in God. He does not explain the content of such beliefs. Are all such
beliefs of fallen humans false beliefs, so that they do not constitute (theoretical) knowledge? This seems implausible. Or are they true but lacking
some other property necessary for knowledge? He develops no epistemological apparatus to clarify his claims. He is simply vague about how this
"belief in God" present in every fallen person differs from the "belief in
God" Plantinga is concerned with elucidating and which Beversluis asserts
cannot be arrived at without grace.

Ill. Calvin on Post-Lapsarian Natural Knowledge of God
In response to Beversluis I would claim that Calvin does teach that fallen, and yes unregenerate, people do hold (some) true beliefs about God,
where such beliefs are among the deliverances of reason. 8 In this sense,
then, fallen humans can and do have a natural knowledge of God apart
from an internal work of the Spirit. Beversluis mentions Calvin's awareness of Paul's statement in Romans: "the invisible things of God from the
creation of the world are dearly seen, being understood by the things that
are made" (Romans 1:20). But the suppressing of the truth in unrighteousness that Paul goes on to develop certainly seems to presuppose that what
God has revealed "is understood."
Calvin comments:
He [Paul] does not mention all the particulars which may be thought
to belong to God; but he states, that we can arrive at the knowledge
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of his eternal power and divinity; for he who is the framer of all
things, must necessarily be without beginning and from himself.
When we arrive at this point, the divinity becomes known to us,
which cannot exist except accompanied with all the attributes of a
God, since they are all included under that idea ....Yet let this difference be remembered, that the manifestation of God, by which he
makes his glory known in his creation, is, with regard to the light
itself, sufficiently clear; but that on account of our blindness it is not
found to be sufficient. ... We conceive that there is a Deity; and then
we conclude that he ought to be worshiped: but our reason here fails,
because it cannot ascertain who or what sort of being God isYO
In his Commentary Upon the Acts of the Apostles, Calvin relates the
account of Paul and Barnabas who offered arguments for the providential
care of God since "they take this principle, that in the order of nature there
is a certain and evident manifestation of God."" Calvin does not disapprove. Presumably Beversluis would, for if this order in nature is seen only
by faith, the Apostle was acting foolishly. Moreover, it is this "evident
manifestation" which forms the basis of Paul's apologetic at Mars Hill.
According to Calvin, Paul "showeth by natural arguments who and what
God is,"'2 and since "he hath to deal with profane men, he draweth proofs
from nature itself; for in vain should he have cited testimonies of
Scripture."" Now although Calvin is careful to note in this context that
there is a "true knowledge of God" which is a gift and comes by faith, this
is carefully distinguished from a "general knowledge of God"14 which
remains in fallen humans. Calvin says that by nature fallen humans are
imbued with some sense of God: "aliquo Dei sensu imbuti sunt". Although
unregenerate people entertain wrong ideas about God, or in some cases
even deny his existence, Calvin insists that there is a natural knowledge of
God in fallen humans. In his commentaries on both Romans and Acts
Calvin says that the natural knowledge is "insufficient." But Calvin is clear
about the nature of this "insufficiency." For one, it is only a knowledge of
God as Creator, not as Redeemer. Secondly, since without grace fallen
humans have confused ideas of God, Scripture helps us to understand
properly who and what God is, thereby disabusing us of false notions
about the Creator. Most importantly, man's natural knowledge is not
salvific - does not include a love of and obedience to God. What Calvin
calls a "true", "clear", or "pure" knowledge of God is both affective and
effective. Man's natural knowledge of God is not. '5
Calvin's position in the commentaries is consistent with what he says in
the Institutes. In the Institutes Calvin distinguishes between a "pure and
clear knowledge" of God (which has reference to both a right conception of
what God is and affective knowledge) and "perceptions" or "convictions"
that "there is some God" (1.3.3) or "some conception of God" 0.3.2) and
that "he is their Maker" (1.3.1).16 When Calvin refers to the "primal and
simple knowledge to which the very order of nature would have led us if
Adam had remained upright" 0.2.1), he is referring to knowledge in the
former sense. This knowledge certainly includes a propositional component. Calvin says that even the few who deny that God exists, "from time

98

Faith and Philosophy

to time feel an inkling of what they desire not to believe" 0.3.2). Calvin
seems to think of knowledge of God's existence in this sense as something
like a "bare" knowledge of God, which carries with it some notion of God's
nature. This is clearly propositional knowledge, as opposed to the more
affective or experiential knowledge that is Calvin's main interest. The failure of this 'bare" knowledge is partly epistemic: people sometimes have
false beliefs about God (though Calvin is careful not to assert that no one
has any true beliefs about God). More importantly, the bare knowledge
does not affect fallen humans as it ought. We are not moved to love and
worship God. Beversluis has correctly located this failure of natural knowledge. But Calvin most certainly does not deny that the sensus divinitatis is
functional in fallen humans so that it produces no true theistic beliefs. 17
There still remains what I am calling a propositional knowledge. This
knowledge at least includes propositions of the form "there is some God,"
"God is one," "God is powerful," and "God is Creator of the world." In
this sense, according to Calvin, fallen humans can and do have a natural
knowledge of God.

W. Theistic Knowledge and Accountability to God
Beversluis rightly points out that for Calvin natural revelation has a postlapsarian function: leaving humans "without excuse" for their sins before
God (RRO, p. 195). The original edition of the Institutues, being modeled on
Luther's Catechism, introduced the topic of "knowledge of God" in the context of an exposition of the law of God, thereby placing Calvin's epistemological discussion in a distinct moral and religious context. But what exactly
is the connection between the implicit epistemological claims and the
explicit issue of moral and/or religious accountability before God? It has
been argued that fallen humans are responsible before God because there is
an objectively clear revelation of God in the created order, but men fail to
see this revelation of God as creator because, as fallen, they are noetically
blind. Moreover, though our noetic blindness is a consequence of our fallen
nature, we are nonetheless responsible for our fallen nature and so responsible before God. This model would seem to provide Beversluis with a way
of maintaining the post-Iapsarian relevance of natural revelation without
affirming any post-Iapsarian natural knowledge. IS
Beversluis might find some support for this claim as others have in the
Institutes (1.5.14-15). In these chapters Calvin seems to base human
accountability on the fact that God's revelation in creation is objectively
clear and humans are blind to it because they have willingly chosen to
smother the natural light God has given them. The manifestation of God in
creation renders men inexcusable 0.5.14) and we are prevented from
acquiring by natural ability a pure and clear knowledge of God, but "all
excuse is cut off because the fault of dullness is within us" (1.5.15). Yet
though elsewhere Calvin grounds the noetic effects of sin in the transmission of a sinful nature inherited from Adam (so that we are all born with
noetic defects of some sort), Calvin here emphasizes noetic corruption as
caused by acts of personal sin. Notice, though, that the natural revelation
in creation strikes "some sparks" but "their fuller light" is what is smoth-
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ered by perverted human will. Consequently, we are not led on "the right
path.// Calvin is concerned with the willful corruption of the "seed of the
knowledge of God" so that it fails to bear "proper fruit." The discussion of
the (inherited and acquired) noetic effects of sin in the Institutes is compatible with some bare knowledge of God.
This conclusion is further substantiated by Calvin's exposition of
Romans 1:18-23, which inspired and forms the background to the discussion in the Institutes. In his 1540 Commentary on Romans Calvin explicitly
asserts that it is a kllow/edge of God possessed by fallen human persons
which renders them inexcusable. 19 After affirming the majesty of God set
forth in the created order, Calvin makes three claims: (i) the evidence of
God's existence in creation is sufficiently clear in itself, (ii) it is rendered
obscure [not eradicated] by human blindness, and (iii) human blindness
does not preclude our having some knowledge of God in our fallen state.
Calvin writes: "We are not so blind that we can plead our ignorance as an
excuse for our perverseness. We conceive that there is a Deity; and then we
conclude, that whoever he may be, he ought to be worshipped ....but this
knowledge which avails only to take away excuse, differs greatly from that
which brings salvation...."20 Calvin's interest here is to affirm some postlapsarian knowledge of God as a basis for accountability to God, while at
the same time denying the completeness or purity of this knowledge, for
he says that it is only by the light of Scripture and faith that we can obtain
the knowledge of "who or what sort of being God is.//
Calvin apparently has a complex theory of moral and religious accountability. There are both positive and negative grounds of inexcusability. We
are born with original sin derived from Adam, and this entails inherited
noetic effects of sin. In this context we are without excuse when we fail to
worship God because, despite the inherited noetic effects of sin, we know
at least this much: there is a Creator God and He ought to be worshipped. 21
But there are also acquired noetic effects of sin, and as a consequence we
are also without excuse if we lack a clear knowledge of God, because we
willingly corrupt our natural knowledge of God.
Having said this I hasten to add that the presence of some natural
knowledge of God in fallen, unregenerate people is compatible with their
not acknowledging the existence of God or their claiming not to believe or
know that God exists. Self-deception may be regarded as another noetic
effect of sin. Calvin certai.nly holds that humans rebel against the light God
has offered them in nature. But this rebellion, supression of truth in
unrighteousness, and corruption of the clear knowledge of God are all
compatible with a set of true beliefs and stock of natural knowledge of
God. 22 Persons may know that God exists, even if they choose to live their
life without reference to him. Beversluis comes close to seeing this point
when he says that all people believe in God but not all acknowledge their
beliefs. What Beversluis should have argued is that, though there are natural theistic beliefs produced by a functioning sensus divinitatis, we must
recognize that this faculty (or related ones) is subject to various malfunctions that entail the production of a mixture of true and false theistic
beliefs, as well as a refusal to acknowledge one's theistic beliefs.23 But this
way of looking at matters is entirely compatible with what Plantinga says
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about the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga's examples of properly basic
beliefs are a legitimate elaboration of the propositional content
thinks is epistemically accessible for fallen humans by natural
alone, even though such knowledge is not what Calvin thinks
"true" or "pure" knowledge of God.

theistic
Calvin
reason
of as a

v. Conclusion
Plantinga's epistemological account of the sensus divinitatis is a rigorous
epistemological unpacking of Calvin's empirical claim that people do
believe in God and that this belief is universally distributed. Beversluis
fails to see that this point is similar to what he himself concedes in the second part of the article, thereby rendering his critical account of Plantinga in
the first part of the article fundamentally wrong-headed. Although Calvin
may not have been interested in epistemological questions, epistemological
commitments are implicit in the text. Moreover, Beversluis' identification
of normativity with "justification" (being within one's intellectual rights)
overlooks a second kind of normativity which is the focus of Plantinga's
more recent work: the normativity of proper function (how something
should function when it is functioning in accordance with a design plan of
some sort). Perhaps Calvin was not concerned with matters of rationality
construed as "intellectual rights." Perhaps such a thing never entered his
head. But Calvin is certainly committed to the view that we are created in
the image of God and thus created with a theistic purpose. This creative act
and theistic purpose is revealed everywhere in our life. Plantinga's position is that it is revealed in our cognitive life as well. Maybe this is not the
most important consequence of being created in the image of God, but it is
hardly irrelevant. When human beings are functioning properly (as God
designed them) they do in fact form various theistic beliefs. We can call this
a rationality of proper function. Because of sin, the sensus divinitatis is subject to various malfunctions. People do not always form theistic belief(s),
sometimes they do not form theistic belief(s) with the degree of firmness
which is specified by God's design plan, and - as Calvin points out humans sometimes form false beliefs about God. All of this seems to me to
be a legitimate development and explanation of Calvin's implicit epistemology based on a rigorous theistic metaphysics. 24
Beversluis has in typical Barthian fashion confused two distinct issues:
the epistemic efficacy and the behavioral efficacy of knowledge of God. Better
yet, he has confused the proper and pure knowledge of God (with its affective and moral element) with what lies within the grasp of fallen natural
reason at the theoretical level. As far as I can see, Plantinga nowhere says
that the kind of knowledge he is concerned with elucidating vis-a-vis the
sensus divinitatis has the behavioral efficacy which Beversluis thinks Calvin
associates with the knowledge of God. So even if this is Calvin's objection
to natural theology, it is not clear that Plantinga has underestimated the
noetic effects of sin. Plantinga may have a different interest from Calvin,
but there is no significant discontinuity between them regarding the extent
of the noetic effects of sin. If we understand by "knowledge" a purely
"epistemic" category, loosely corresponding to true belief plus "something
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else" (justification, warrant, etc), I do not see that Plantinga is defective at
all. He has not to any significant degree minimized the noetic effects of sin.
Beversluis' two arguments involve a crucial switch in the meaning of the
locution "knowledge of God". The result is a logical disconnectedness
between his arguments, and a loss of internal coherence within the paper
as a whole. When he denies that Calvin holds that there is a natural knowledge of God for fallen humans, either he is using that locution as he does
on pages 198-9 (to refer to affective knowledge) or he is using it as
Plantinga does. If he means the former, then his comments are inapplicable
to Plantinga's position, as the two are talking about two different things. If,
on the other hand, Beversluis uses knowledge as Plantinga is using the
term, then what Beversluis says is not consistent with either Calvin or, as I
see it, Beversluis' own claims in the second part of his article. So perhaps
there are two Reformed objections to natural theology (I suspect there are
more than that). One thing is clear, the Barthian assessment of Calvin still
falters in that it fails to distinguish the different ways Calvin himself uses
the word "knowledge," and hence fails to capture the ways in which fallen
humans do and do not have a natural knowledge of God. 25
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NOTES
1. All references to this article will hereafter be cited parenthetically in the
text with the abbreviation, RRO.
2. Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and Rationality, ed.
Plantinga and WoIterstorff (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame,
1983), pp. 65-67.
3. Alvin Plantinga, "The Prospects for Natural Theology" in Philosophical
Perspectives,S, 1991, pp. 303-310. See also his forthcoming Warranted Christian
Belief, chapter 8.
4. It is not clear whether Beversluis intends "knowledge of God" here to
mean "existential" knowledge (in which case he is quite correct) or "theoretical" knowledge of God as Redeemer (in which case he is also correct) or "theoretical" knowledge of God as Creator (in which case he is not correct).
5. To be more technical, what we have according to Plantinga is a design
plan for our cognitive life that stipulates the sorts of beliefs we should form in
certain circumstances (the force of "should" here corresponds to the normativity of proper function). This extends to theistic belief(s) as well. Following
Plantinga, let us assume that the cognitive module responsible for basic theistic
belief is the sensus divinitatis.The design plan will include a broad range of circumstance-belief pairs such as <sight of the starry night sky, firm belief that
God created all this>. When the sensus divinitatis is functioning properly, this is
how things will go. Conversely, when it is not functioning properly, the widely
realized experiential circumstance(s) will not be accompanied by a corresponding firm theistic belief. We will get things like <sight of the starry night sky,
less than firm belief that God created all this> or <sight of the starry night sky,
[no theistic belief]>. These will be some of the ways of spelling out the noetic
effects of sin given Plantinga's theory of warrant and proper function. For a
more thorough account of this, and its consequences for natural theology, see
my hopefully forthcoming "Proper Function and the Epistemic Consequences
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of the Noetic Effects of Sin."
6. Calvin's distinctive use of "knowledge" is developed by Edward
Dowey (who calls it an existential knowledge), Gerald Postema (who contrasts
knowledge as commitment and knowledge as merely propositional), William
Bouwsma (who distinguishes between affective and frigid knowledge), and
Dewey Hoitenga (who distinguishes between a propositional and moral component to knowledge of God). See Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's
Theology, 3rd Edition (Eerdman's Publishing Company: Grand Rapids, MI.,
1994; reprint, 1952), pp. 24-31; Postema, "Calvin's Alleged Rejection of Natural
Theology," in Calvin and Calvinism, vol. 7, ed. Richard C. Gamble (Garland
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